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Whatever the measures in the fight against terrorism are they cannot transcend the most
important consequence of "9/11", which is the privatisation of warfare. "9/11" is not only an
attack against the symbols of power that the most powerful country in the world stands for. It
introduces an unparalleled asymmetry into global relations, namely the asymmetry between
state-channelled means of protection and society-based means of terror. The core of the issue
is not whether NATO could any longer remain confined to "in area" reactions or whether it
will be bound to increasingly act "out of area" in order to fight threats to the alliance
partners. The set of new threats requires a new assessment of the notion of security and new
dimensions of security strategies on local, national, and international levels. "9/11" has
begun a period of soul-searching and of hard choices in the Western world. Its consequences
will go way beyond the war on terrorism: "9/11" has become the rather unpleasant
"opportunity" for the Atlantic civilisation to redefine its cause in contributing
to world order in the 21st century.
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1. Introduction
The terrible terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 have the potential of transforming the world
order in a way no other event or process was able to
do since the end of the Cold War. In retrospect, the
period of 1989/91 until 200 1might be seen as a "late
summer" before the return of rough waters in world
politics. At the core of the matter, the post-"9/11"
transformation of world power is not only about
power equations between states. It is about the char-
acter of power as such. If"9/11" stands symbolically
for anything deep and fundamental it symbolizes the
failure of state-centered definitions of deterrence. It
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symbolizes the end of the state monopoly on the le-
gitimate use of force (Gewaltmonopol des Staates),
one of the key elements of state sovereignty in the
modem world.
Whatever the military or policing measures in
the fight against terrorism are, and no matter how
necessary they are; they cannot transcend the most
important consequence of "9/11", which is the pri-
vatisation of warfare. "9111" is not only an attack
against the symbols of power that the most powerful
country in the world stands for. It introduces an un-
paralleled asymmetry into global relations, namely
the asymmetry between state-channelled means of
protection and society-based means of terror. The
intuitive reaction of citizens all around the world to
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the terror attacks of "9/11" was towards their na-
tion-state in search of protection with means of po-
licing and military. It was understandable and yet it
was insufficient as far as the new dimensions of glo-
bal threat are concerned.
Regarding the transatlantic reaction to the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the core of the
issue is not whether NATO could any longer remain
confined to "in area" reactions or whether it will be
bound to increasingly act "out of area" in order to
fight threats to the alliance partners. The assump-
tion that the new dimension of threat means the pri-
vatisation of warfare, the deliberate use of civilians
as targets of violence, and the deliberate use of "sur-
prise" as a means to launch attacks, challenges the
fundamental patterns of proven state reactions and
international relations. Unpredictability has become
an element of unique intensity in the evolution of
world politics. The new dimensions of threats after
"9/11" do imply "in state" or "in government" com-
ponents as much as "out of state" or "out of govern-
ment" components. Worst of all, the threat is very
much inside the Atlantic world itself as the exist-
ence of "terrorist sleeper cells" suggest, whether or
not they are linked to strategic operations of Al Qaeda
or other terrorist networks or even to potential ter-
rorist activities of aggressive governments in "rogue
states". It might be debatable whether there can be
"private terrorism" without some sort of organized
and comprehensive state sponsorship. In light of the
multifarious dimensions of possible modem terror-
ism, this is a rather academic question. The use of
terrorist means to attack another country or society
clearly introduces asymmetric notions of warfare into
the traditional strategic and military interpretation
of conflicts. Asymmetric warfare, whether state-
driven or based on "privatized" terrorism, might un-
fold in many ways:
- Terrorists and states can manufacture and use
lethal biological weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction;
- Increases in information technology and the
integration of world trading and financial systems
are steadily increasing the danger of cyber warfare
and terrorism;
- Global transportation systems are increas-
ingly exposed to dangers of a terrorist nature.
2. Threat perception
The set of new threats requires a new assess-
ment of the notion of security and new dimensions
of security strategies on local, national, and interna-
tionallevels. The transatlantic community has been
challenged by "9/11" to rethink its specific strategic
reaction. I Globalisation, whatever the term implies,
is defined by a unique combination of technological
means and practical expressions of unprecedented
interdependence around the globe. Technology does
not know borders any longer. Technology does not
know limits, laws and equivalent modes of respond-
ing to its effects either. Technology is neither good
nor bad, and it would mean to miss the point if the
recognition of the transforming character oftechnol-
ogy would simply be used for anti-technological re-
sponses. It requires however penetrating analysis to
understand the nature of the threat symbolized in "9/
11". It is a threat, which does not know borders
anymore; it is~ threat that does not know taboos
anymore; it is a threat that does not meet equivalent
and complementary measures ofa monopoly of state
power anymore. "9/11" means the end to the state
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
This does not mean that reactions according
to the traditional logic of the state monopoly on the
legitimate use of force have become completely
wrong or useless. The state remains the guarantor of
the security of its citizens to the best of its ability.
The debate whether policing measures taken after
"9/11" might infringe upon people's rights was there-
fore both artificial and overdone. It showed that the
state monopoly on the legitimate use offorce, so long
contested in the name of civil liberties, has become
an instrument to guarantee civil liberties at least in
Western democracies. The unwavering confidence
into this perception of the modem state has been
deeply shaken by "9/11" and its implications. Wher-
ever dictatorship prevails, the state also remains the
potentially biggest agent of aggression against other
states and other societies. This is why the question
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is
extremely crucial in the context of countries work-
ing on such weapons. The borders between a state-
led use of aggression, state-sponsored aggression or
privatised aggression, which either holds a state hos-
tage or operates independently from any state, have
become permeable.
Ifviolence, even in its maximal form without
any taboo or limit, becomes an act of private deci-
sion, the state monopoly in countering violence
through a monopoly of military and policing meas-
ures becomes clumsy, permeable and questionable.
This notion of state-centered decisionism was heav-
ily shattered on "9/11".
The realization that terrorist groups can even
hijack states as in the case of Afghanistan makes the
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new challenge even more uncomfortable. Suicide
bombers in the Middle East add to the new chal-
lenge of asymmetric warfare. It has become ques-
tionable whether or not the Western sovereign state,
still firmly holding to the notion of the state mo-
nopoly on the legitimate use of force as the central
guarantor of civil liberties, can truly act coherently
and with sustainable success in the face of the new
dimension of privati sed warfare. While "9/11" is felt
as a threat to everybody, it was a particular blow to
the legitimacy of the modern state. This situation can
both be seen as a hopeless tragedy or as an opportu-
nity. Whether either the United States or Europe will
be capable of living up to the intellectual challenge
"9/11" has generated in terms of the threat percep-
tion for the 21 st century, remains to be seen. So far,
the reactions on both sides ofthe Atlantic Ocean were
rather intuitive and hence limited. Confronted with
an exceptional threat, America is inclined to act
unidimensional, thus hoping to counterbalance the
power of evil it is confronted with. Confronted with
an exceptional threat, Europe is inclined to invoke
multidimensional categories of assessment of the
situation and solutions to reach both its root causes
and all possible ramifications. Neither approach
might suffice to come to terms with the secular im-
plication of "9/11".
Without any doubt, state power remains nec-
essary in fighting terrorism. The more aggressive and
wicked terrorists act, the more likely it is that they
do not do so on their own. They need an infrastruc-
ture that has to be traced down. They might use shel-
ter and cover up, financial and logistical support that
has to be targeted and destroyed. They use means of
communication and conspiracy, which cannot remain
hidden if properly investigated. Hard state power
remains inevitable to fight the war against terrorism.
It will always become somewhat contradictory when
the enemy is wrapped in a multi-layered combina-
tion of state authority (such as Iraq, Taliban Afghani-
stan), state sponsored actions (such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, Al Qaeda) and extremely privatised tar-
geting through personalized tools (such as suicide
terrorism against innocent civilians). It might also
mean that hard power infrastructure like military in-
stitutions become more of a target than remaining
an instrument in a successful fight against terrorism.
The notion of a state monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of force as a necessary means in protecting
citizens against terror attacks has become shattered,
not on grounds of theoretical opposition, but on
grounds of practical state capacities to do so. Ter-
rorists, as "9/11" has proven, are no longer "out
there", but they are among us, they can be every-
where and in fact they have proven to be everywhere.
"9/11" is equivalent to the "Middle Easternisation
of the West", to terrorism which on purpose looks
for civilian targets and victims. Whatever else to fear
in the future, since many "sleeper cells" linked to
the Al Qaeda network do exist already in Western
societies, and in fact also in non-Western societies,
one must recognize how difficult it will be to bring
terrorism to its places of origin in the Middle East
and the Arab world. Terrorism is already among us
and the past experiences with terrorism in Europe
(like IRA, ETA, Red Brigades or Baader-Meinhof)
are incomparable with the new global dimension the
world is confronted with.
After "9/11", many Americans were wonder-
ing if Europe and the US would share the same no-
tion of the threat perception the Western world is
facing. There seemed to be consensus that terrorism
was posing a threat to Western civilization, Western
type liberties and to a peaceful living together of
people with different ethnic or religious backgrounds.
There seemed to be consensus that terrorism requires
global countermeasures. As much as no country
should or could react on its own, America should
not be left alone and Europe needs to strongly sup-
port America. The degree of consultation on strat-
egy, tactics and actions as well as the degree on con-
sensual cooperation versus a unilateral urge in the
US was as much focus of the debate as it could pos-
sibly be in the transatlantic relations. The open ques-
tion was whether the degree of diverging perceptions
and conflicting opinions was higher than usual.
Surely, the sensitivities were higher than ever
before. Hardly anybody raised the question whether
or not any military and policing reaction could be up
to the new challenge at all.
The US was torn, not for the first time, be-
tween superpower-instincts and an inclination to
build a fortress America, much in line with the call
for isolationism of her first President, George Wash-
ington, that "there can be no greater error than to
expect or calculate, upon real favours from Nation
to Nation". Europe was torn, also not surprisingly,
between commitment to transatlantic solidarity based
either on values and shared interests or the assump-
tion that only if Europe would stand shoulder to
shoulder with the US it could prevent the US from
conducting exaggerated and unproportional meas-
ures. Solidarity of values and solidarity of mistrust
converged while other Europeans questioned whether
the US would either understand the root causes of
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"9111", be willing to reflect the reason for "anti-
Americanism" in many parts of the world or whether
the "war on terrorism" would really be fought for
the same purpose and with the same objectives.'
Diverging perceptions of the threat and its
nature remain the crux of the matter in transatlantic
relations. While Americans emphasized the need for
military options in the war against terrorism, no
matter which new fronts might have to be opened,
Europeans were divided on the question whether a
wartime situation actually exists. "Mutual recrimi-
nations" as Jackson Janes and Jeffrey Anderson put
it about six months after "9/11", were "becoming
more frequent and openly public".' Most of this de-
bate was confined to the traditional patterns, reflexes
and impulses of transatlantic relations. As asymmet-
ric as the new series of threats in the world may be,
the transatlantic reactions would remain asymmet-
ric as long as the US and the EU would not see eye-
to-eye as equal partners in the management of a "post-
state monopoly on legitimate use of force-world".
Even such a chaotic new world will require political
leadership and a wise application ofmultilateralism.
The US might be attracted by unilateralism, which
is the flip-side of isolationism, and Europe might
remain tom between problems of governance and
providing appropriate capabilities to both impress
the US, be accepted as a partner in leadership, and
tie the US to multilateral approaches of the extent
Europe would like to see.
In light of the changing nature of power, the
new array of terrorist threats from biological war-
fare and suicide bombs to spectacular attacks on sym-
bols of Western civilization, and the limited role of
the traditional state monopoly on the legitimate use
of force to cope with the new dimensions of threats
to peace and stability in the world, the EU and the
US are forced to narrow their perception of the na-
ture of the threats both transatlantic partners are fac-
ing. This includes not only political consultations
that exist as intensive as ever. It also requires more
than an increase of the networks of the civil socie-
ties (academia, media), which were so successful and
vivid during the decades of the Cold War.
First and foremost, it requires consensus about
a new global agenda which the Atlantic civilization
is confronted with and will have to deal in consent,
or at least on the basis of complementary division of
labour if it succeeds as it did during the second half
of the 20th century. In order to achieve this, a new
"grand strategy" is needed which can truly replace
the one, which served as the underlying foundation
for the transatlantic alliance during the decades of
the Cold War. "9/11" has made evident the need for
a new "grand strategy" which can provide for a men-
tal construct to conceptually and practically cope




The Atlantic civilization cannot overlook the
enormous breadth and depth of new challenges it is
facing. In the wake of"9111", it was unclear whether
the diverging tendencies between the US and Eu-
rope were
- a consequence of ideological divisions with
increasing links between the policy debates on both
sides of the Atlantic which would have to take into
account different policy preferences between a Re-
publican administration in Washington and a major-
ity ofleft of centre governments in the member states
of the European Union;
- a more general problem of transatlantic gov-
ernance dealing with increasingly disparate views
on policy relaters stemming from diverging notions
of the role of power, the role of state sovereignty,
the notion of multilateralism and the importance of
international cooperation while American unilater-
alism and "Euro-Gaullism" were evolving simulta-
neously;
- a consequence of unfinished globalisation
along with the problem of framing the various de-
bates and developments of the world in the early 2151
century through the prism of a focused understand-
ing of its inherent nature, its dangers and its oppor-
tunities.
Depending on which starting point one would
take, the implications for a strategic assessment of
the new paradigm the world order started to gener-
ate would be different:
- a return to ideological politics within the
Western world, not the least between Americans and
Europeans;
- a forward looking understanding of power
politics and its meaning in the new century;
- a multidimensional approach which would
be able to strengthen the Atlantic civilization rather
than defining it by its ability to limit agreement be-
tween its key partners.
The third choice would clearly be most prom-
ising, although not necessarily the easiest one. It
would require to contextualise "9111" and put it into
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the perspective of its larger relevance for the future
evolution of world politics. This would be esuiva-
lent to the re-making of the world at the end of world
War II. Before a grand strategy was designed at that
time, which shaped the course of the Cold War and
all ups and downs of the transatlantic relations dur-
ing its decades, a proper analysis of the situation took
place. This was the work of a few "wise men" on the
side of the United States, and it was the work of en-
lightened statesmen in post-war Europe. While the
war against terrorism prevailed, it was difficult to
conceptualise it as the starting point for a new glo-
bal paradigm. But nothing less was needed if"9/11"
was to be transformed from a "defining moment" in
history into the formative experience of a new era
and as the "hour zero" for the shaping of a new glo-
bal paradigm.
This would require analysts to broaden the
perspective from "9/11" as an act of war to an as-
sessment of the root causes underlying this brutal
act. The key notion of the Cold War was encapsu-
lated in the title of Karl Popper's magnificent study
"The Open Society and Its Enemies'". More than
any other intellectual contribution this book grasped
the scientific root causes of the era which was de-
fined by the division between democracy and dicta-
torship, by the components of political totalitarian-
ism and its seductive messages, by the combination
of ideological, political, military and cultural strug-
gles. The enemies of the open society were repre-
sentatives of the same cultural background. The bat-
tle over the "open society" was a battle within the
Western world, among thinkers, agitators and actors
in the world between Vancouver and Vladivostok.
The enemies of the open society were by and large
part of the same intellectual tradition and cultural
background. Only after the Cold War had completely
unfolded, a dividing line between "the West" and
"the East" was drawn. This recognized the geographi-
cal splits, which had taken place right through Cen-
tral Europe after 1945. It facilitated political, mili-
tary and ideological categorizations and became
something of an abbreviation for the description of
a larger and more complex conflict. It came as no
surprise that with the end of the Cold War, most Cen-
tral European countries claimed their "return to the
West", while Russia embarked on a Western oriented
strategy even if it would remain a case sui generis,
no longer adversarial to the West, but also distinct
from Western and Central European societies.
The formative mental construction of the new
post "9/11" world might be labelled "The global so-
ciety and its enemies". The attack on the World Trade
Center was a symbolic attack on economic and cul-
tural globalisation. It brought about a form of terror-
ism, which gave expression to the darkest possible
side of globalisation. Its effects were felt globally
and its context was truly global. If the paradigm of
the 21st century was to be "globalisation", its enemies
are definitely manifold and they are so for different
reasons:
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization,
some argue against the dominance of cultural
globalisation which they see as an attack on hetero-
geneous identities;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization,
some argue against the economic power of
globalisation which they see as leading to exclusion
of many members of the human family;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization,
some criticize globalisation as becoming equivalent
with "Americanisation";
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization,
some criticize technological globalisation as a con-
tribution to dehumanising human life and human
relations;
- inside and outside the Atlantic civilization,
some understand globalisation as intrinsically driven
by human self idolization, thus undermining the val-
ues and norms of any religion, humility among them.
The amount of grievances in the world is not
less strong or stronger in the early 21 st century than
it was at other times. Notions of recognition of jus-
tice were as strong and complex as ever. While the
"global society" had become neither complete nor
perfect or morally superior, its critics were as broad
in their outlooks, priorities and orientations as could
be. But what was binding them together was critique
and rejection of the emerging global society. The
expressions of this opposition were as diverse as
human behavior can be. Endless shortcomings and
limits of globalisation were supporting one aspect
of the critique or another. But all in all, no opposi-
tion to the emerging global society was as forceful
and violent as terrorism symbolized in its most grue-
some brutality by the events of "9/11". Terrorism
has become the darkest side of globalisation.
Its aggression is of a totalitarian fanaticism
comparable only to the great and wicked totalitarian
movements of the 20th century. As much as propo-
nents of Nazi or communist totalitarianism in the 20th
century, historian Jeffrey Herfwrote, "today's Islamic
fundamentalist fanatics are convinced that they pos-
sess absolute truth which is immune from refutation
or criticism; they despise Western modernity yet
borrow its technological accomplishments in an ef-
fort to destroy it. They believe that force and terror
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are necessary to establish a utopia in place of the
current decadent and corrupt world; and they explain
history on the basis of conspiratorial construct in
which the United States, more than "international
Jewry" or global capitalism, plays the central role."
And: "Osama Bin Laden and AI Qaeda emerge in a
global political culture in which elements of leftist
anti-globalisation discourse and reruns offascist and
Nazi visions of Jewish conspiracies merge with reli-
gious passion."? Herf, whose analysis of Nazi ideol-
ogy as "reactionary modernism" gained attention
twenty years ago, concluded that "9/11" was "a ter-
ribly clear act of reactionary modernist rage ... Is-
lamic fundamentalism borrows the West's technol-
ogy in order to destroy it."?
Terrorism has always been linked to totalitar-
ian movements in the past. It should be no surprise
that the enemies of the global society have begun to
organize and to express themselves in a similar man-
ner as their Nazi or communist predecessors. The
age of ideological seduction has found a new ex-
pression in Islamic terrorism. "To the fanatic," Elie
Wiesel wrote, "everything is black or white, curse
or blessing, friend or foe - and nothing in between.
He is immune to doubt and hesitation. He perceives
tolerance as weakness." The terror attacks of"9/11"
are the most evident expression of this fanaticism.
However, the terrorism of"9i 11 " is nothing but the
bloody peak ofa much deeper set of problems. These
problems are linked, inter alia, to the character and
evolution ofIslamic societies confronted with mod-
ernization and Western democracy. They are like-
wise linked with the growing formation of dislike
against the promise of globalisation and its inevita-
ble weaknesses inside and outside the Western world.
"9/ 11 " shed a flash light on the many threads of
contempt for the emerging civilization of
globalisation, but the shades of the problems which
they are representing are not only lit in the sharp
light of "9/11". Many of the root causes of "9/11"
are rather grey and not just black and white. Thus,
both the analysis and the consequences stemming
from it must be multidimensional and recognize the
interlocking nature of the underlying root causes of
the new terrorism threat to civilization.
It will require lasting intellectual efforts to link
the proper analysis of the forces which represent
enmity to the global society with the search for a
comprehensive grand strategy of the Atlantic civili-
zation in order to fight them appropriately and suc-
cessfully. Nothing less is the consequence which the
United States and Europe have to draw from "9/11"
as the "hour zero" of a new epoch:




1. The vulnerability of complex modem soci-
eties. There will never be absolute security as long
as freedom prevails. Consolation can only be found
in religious notions of the value and ultimate pur-
pose of life and afterlife and in the recognition of
the relative and limited success of all human endeav-
our. The more we appreciate human life and human
dignity, the more we have to accept its limits. If nee-
essary, this must be learned anew the more perfec-
tionist our societies seem to become.
2. The benefit of containment. Strategies of
containment are necessary in order to prevent the
consequences of vulnerability to spread in uncon-
trolled ways and to escalate beyond acceptable
means. Containing the violent enemies of global so-
ciety demands strong military and policing measures,
multilateral political coalitions and a resolve of ap-
plying all options necessary in order to deter forces
which willingly spread destruction, fear and hate.
3. The hope of inclusion and recognition. So
far, a global society is emerging only in rudimentary
forms with limited scope both in terms of coherent
"content" and universal territorial outreach. What-
ever possible has to be done to increase the sustain-
able inclusion of individuals, societies, cultures and
states into the emerging global society. Incentives
must be provided to make it worthwhile to recog-
nize the benefits of the global society by being rec-
ognized in one's own individuality and identity by
the global society itself.
4. The advantage of honesty. To engage each
and every line of thinking into some sort of a dia-
logue has become an incarnate expression of West-
ern tolerance. Instead of a dialogue among cultures,
often a culture of dialogue has developed. To trans-
form it into a viable contribution to a sincere dia-
logue of cultures, honesty and clarity about one's
own position and goals are necessary. As paradoxi-
cal as it might sound: To overcome relativism of
standpoint is necessary if fanaticism of action is to
be prevented.
5. The need for universal recognition of hu-
man dignity. No killing is justified in the name of
any God or human ideology. Only recognition of the
inherent dignity of all other members of the human
family can make the vulnerable global society a l1U-
man experience for any individual. Fundamental
human rights must be universally recognized to al-
low any moral dialogue among cultures and people
and to strengthen the legitimacy of any political sys-
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From these basic assumptions follows a sim-
ple and yet fundamental consequence. Any viable
and farsighted political strategy accepting the
premises described above, will have to resort to two
complex tasks: containment and inclusion. Neither
of these tasks will be simple and unidimensional.
Both require inherently multilateral approaches. If
"containment and inclusion" shall serve as the sum-
marizing and forming notions of the new paradigm
necessary to focus the Atlantic civilization in its strife
for the future world-order, their implications have to
be spelled out in breadth and in depth. They will
require a global view on both sides of the Atlantic.
Neither American unilateralism nor European
insularism will be helpful for either partner to cope
with the world ahead. Global coalitions will be
needed, in many cases reaching beyond the Atlantic
world. There will be and their must be room for the
pursuit of specific interests of either the US or the
EU, for complementarity of both partners wherever
possible and for a joint outreach towards solutions
as often as feasible. Nothing of this is easy nor does
it come natural. While the 21 st century is unfolding,
the stakes are as high as the controversies are loom-
ing ahead of both the US and the EU.
Five priorities arise in order to translate, the,
notion of "containment and inclusion" from abstract
strategy to concrete policies supporting the emer-
gence of a global society managed by the US and the
EU:
1. The US and the EU must recognize their
common role in forging a new world order. This in-
cludes the need to respect and enhance global gov-
ernance through the promotion of multilateral insti-
tutions, multilateral regulatory mechanisms and the
effects of international law. Diverging positions on
these matters might be the single most dangerous
gulf in the current evolution of political understand-
ing on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Contradic-
tions between the pride claim of representing the
values of law and justice and disrespect for the bind-
ing nature of multilateral mechanisms of governance
and regulation will increasingly undermine credibil-
ity of the US in world affairs while the EU must over-
come its capability gap in terms of military and policy
operations "out of area".
2. The need to contain state-based, state-spon-
sored or privati sed forms of aggression against the
integrity and innocence of individual human life and
of the emerging global society remains crucial in
order to uphold a peaceful and prosperous develop-
ment of the global society. The US and the EU must
provide all necessary military policing, political,
economic and cultural means and the underlying
budgets, but they also must organize the decision
making processes in a way compatible with respect
for the Atlantic partnership as an end in itself and
with recognition of the stakes involved in it. All nec-
essary measures to cope with the evil of terrorism
must be applied in the name of maintaining security
and safety as an important individual and social right.
3. The goal to include as many individuals,
societies, states and cultures into the emerging glo-
bal society requires multidimensional, multi-layered
and multilateral approaches with particular empha-
size on recognizing "development as freedom"; fo-
cus on good governance, rule of law and political
accountability; empowerment of people through edu-
cation and civil society participation; recognition of
human rights and basic criteria of the democratic
process, particularly in the Arab world. Development
policies and the promotion of good governance will
be refocused in light of the post-"9Ill" experiences.
They must contribute to inclusion both on the cul-
tural as well as on the political and economic level.
They must target people as their goal and wherever
necessary they must not shy away from tainting rc-
gimes as their obstacle.
4. If necessary, most daunting international
conflicts, such as the Middle East conflict, have to
be resolved by joint means of imposing peace on
failed states, accepting Western responsibility for
enduring nation and state building, and by support-
ing means of rehabilitation, which can empower
states and societies to achieve sustainable develop-
ment and rule oflaw. This requires the Atlantic part-
ners to provide necessary "venture capital" and nec-
essary structural reforms such as liberalizing trade
and limiting subsidies to uncompetitive sectors of
their economy. It will also have implications for
mechanisms and institutions of peacekeeping and
nation-building. A division of labour will not work
according to which the US is defining a grand strat-
egy and the EU will be invited to pay for the follow-
up costs.
5. Global migration has to be organized in a
way which balances the interests of Western socie-
ties for human labour with integration measures ca-
pable of maintaining respect for the dignity of mi-
grants; forces migrants to recognize the political and
legal rules of their host country while preventing
xenophobic movements derailing moderate political
processes in Western societies; encourages increas-
ing knowledge and understanding ofIslam as a reli-
gion within the Western world while fighting against
Islamic fundamentalism inside and outside the West-
ern world. Both the US and the EU have to embark
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Noteson multidimensional approaches in order to come to
terms with integration challenges arising from Mus-
lim migrants while the countries of origin of Mus-
lim migrants to the West have to be encouraged, if
not forced, to better deal with internal root causes of
frustration and grievance due to a lack of openness
and recognition of demands of participation en-
shrined in universal notions of human rights.
None of these priorities will easily translate
into common policies of the EU and the US. It will
require leadership and persistence hardly compara-
ble with anything seen since the formative years of
the Atlantic alliance between 1945 and the early
1950s. The strategy and its goals have to be designed
in ways unprecedented in transatlantic governance.
They have to be communicated to the people on both
sides of the Atlantic ocean in truly memorable
speeches by political leaders comparable to Winston
Churchill's speech in 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, in
which he outlined that an "iron curtain" had gone
down in Europe forcing the Western world to stand
together; comparable also to George C. Marshall's
Commencement Speech at Harvard University in
1947 in which he designed America's commitment
to the recovery of Europe and to a democratic and
united Europe based on America's enlightened self
interest.
"9/11" has begun a period of soul-searching
and of hard choices in the Western world. Its conse-
quences will go way beyond the war on terrorism:
"9/11" has become the rather unpleasant "opportu-
nity" for the Atlantic civilisation to redefine its cause
in contributing to world order in the 21SI century. This
is no easy task and it will engage more than the cur-
rent generation of acting politicians on both sides of
the Atlantic. The foundation stones of this new grand
strategy for the management of the evolving global
society have to be laid out, rather sooner than later.
It is a daunting yet noble challenge for the societies
living on both shores of the Atlantic Ocean. "9/11"
has called on the Atlantic civilization for nothing
less than working together in enlightened self inter-
est for world order in the 21 SI century. Thus "9/11"
defines much more than the need to win the war
against terrorism as important as this aspect of world
order building is.
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